

Cyber insecure vessels at sea

Mate J. Csorba PhD, CEH
Global Service Line Leader, Cyber Security
DNV GL – Digital Solutions

Cyber security trends at sea

- Cyber security threats are progressing and becoming a part of our daily business
- Evolving guidelines and regulations:
 - USCG Maritime Bulk Liquids Transfer Cybersecurity Framework Profile (2016)
 - USCG Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Offshore Operations (draft 2017)
 - IADC Guidelines for Assessing and Managing Cybersecurity Risks to Drilling Assets (2015)
 - IADC Draft Guidelines for Minimum Cybersecurity Requirements for Drilling Assets (2017)
 - DNVGL-RP-0496 Cyber security resilience management for ships and mobile offshore units in operation (2016)
 - DNVGL-RP-G108 Cyber security in the O&G industry based on IEC 62443 (2017)

- The **cyber security exclusion clause** in insurance (Clause 380) is being challenged:
 - Owners expect complete insurance coverage
 - Underwriters need to properly manage their risks





2017: Maersk operations affected by ransomware



2015: Significant amount of reported attacks



2014: U.S. Port hacker attack



2013: Hacking of cargo tracking system


2012: GPS jamming/spoofing

2011: Pirate Cvber Attack

2010: Drilling rig infected with malware

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Maritime safety heavily depends on cyber systems



Operation Technology (OT) risks:

Life, property and environment + Finance and Reputation

Information Technology (IT) risks:

Finance and Reputation

The cyber-asymmetry

Increasing levels of computer control and automation



US Navy pays USD 9.1M for contract extension




 Electronics and software could and will be upgraded over the ship's lifetime

Cyber-attacks can be low-cost alternatives to physical attacks




SDR + AIS ~ 100USD


No need to spoof RF





What to do during the lifecycle of a cyber-enabled vessel?






DNV-GL

RECOMMENDED PRACTICE DNVGL-RP-0496

CYBER SECURITY RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT FOR SHIPS AND MOBILE OFFSHORE UNITS IN OPERATION

DNV GL MARITIME


Doc Number: DNVGL-RP-0496 September 2016



http://www.dnvgl.com/rpcs

DNVGL-RP-0496: Graphical understanding of protection barriers

Leverages existing industry knowledge using Bow-Tie & Barrier management methodologies and transposes this intuitive method to help assess complex attack scenarios



Autonomous LNG carrier #1




75 Preventive barriers:

- Intrusion detection
- Encryption
- Disable unnecessary services
- Segregation of networks
- Multi-factor authentication
- Blacklisting and whitelisting of internet access
- Documented change management process
- Restricted access
- Daily monitoring of logs for unusual activities
- Strict hardening
- Disable auto-run for e.g. USB sticks

• 31 Mitigating barriers, e.g. including:

- Collision avoidance systems
- Back-up procedures
- Emergency response (drills & training)
- External support (e.g. pilot and tug assistance)
- Cyber Security insurance






Popular threat vectors

- Network segregation (a.k.a. air-gaps)
 - Portable storage devices;
 - Covert signaling channels (acoustic, light, RF, etc.)




- Policies & procedures
- BYOD
- Crew welfare
- Maintenance phase attacks
 - Update, upgrade, and patching
- Supply chain and construction phase
 - Protect all levels of the supply chain










*C. Tarnovsky


Why the supply chain / contractors?

- 614 GB of: Sea Dragon material, signals and sensor data, submarine radio room cryptographic systems information, electronic warfare library
- Stolen data highly sensitive, housed on the contractor's unclassified network.. When aggregated, could be considered classified
- Navy spokesman: "There are measures in place that require companies to notify the government when a 'cyber incident' has occurred that has actual or potential adverse effects on their networks that contain controlled unclassified information."
- "The Pentagon has requested or used more than \$300 million for the project since late 2015 and has said it plans to start underwater testing by September."
- Adm. Philip S. Davidson: "And what they cannot develop on their own, they steal often through cyberspace"
- E.g. designs for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; the advanced Patriot PAC-3 missile system; the Army Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system; the Navy's new Littoral Combat Ship
 - Pentagon






*Illustration by Popular Mechanics, from Getty Images




Crew training & awareness





Crew training & awareness





(Film)Crew training & awareness




Responsibilities – and how testing can help











Component/Type testing

Example for a vulnerability in a base component - SSA-818183: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in S7-300 CPU



Siemens Security Advisory by Siemens ProductCERT

SSA-818183: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in S7-300 CPU

 Publication Date
 2016-06-08

 Last Update
 2016-06-08

 Current Version
 V1.0

 CVSSv3 Base Score
 7.5

SUMMARY

Siemens has released a firmware update for the SIMATIC S7-300 CPU family which fixes a vulnerability that could allow remote attackers to perform a Denial-of-Service attack under certain conditions.

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

- SIMATIC S7-300 CPUs with Profinet support: All versions < V3.2.12
- SIMATIC S7-300 CPUs without Profinet support: All versions < V3.3.12

DESCRIPTION

Products of the Siemens SIMATIC S7-300 CPU family have been designed for discrete and continuous control in industrial environments such as manufacturing, food and beverages, and chemical industries worldwide.

Detailed information about the vulnerability is provided below.

VULNERABILITY CLASSIFICATION

The vulnerability classification has been performed by using the CVSS scoring system in version 3 (CVSSv3) (http://www.first.org/cvss/). The CVSS environmental score is specific to the customer's environment and will impact the overall CVSS score. The environmental score should therefore be individually defined by the customer to accomplish final scoring.

Vulnerability Description (CVE-2016-3949)

Specially crafted packets sent to port 102/tcp (ISO-TSAP) or via Profibus could cause the affected device to go into defect mode. A cold restart is required to recover the system

CVSS Base Score 7.5

CVSS Vector CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:P/RL:O/RC:C

Mitigating Factors

- · The attacker must have network access to the affected device.
- Protection-level 3 (Read/Write protection) mitigates the issue.
- · Siemens recommends operating the devices only within trusted networks [2].

SOLUTION

Siemens has released SIMATIC S7-300 firmware version V3.2.12 and V3.3.12 [1] which fixes the vulnerability and recommends customers to update to the latest version.

As a general security measure Siemens strongly recommends to keep the firmware up-todate and to protect network access to the \$7-300 CPUs with appropriate mechanisms. It is advised to configure the environment according to our operational guidelines [2] in order to run the devices in a protected IT environment. Siemens Security Advisory by Siemens ProductCERT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Siemens thanks the following for their support and efforts:

- Mate J. Csorba, DNV GL, Marine Cybernetics Services for coordinated disclosure of the vulnerability.
- Amund Sole, Norwegian University of Science and Technology for coordinated disclosure of the vulnerability.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

- [1] The firmware update for SIMATIC S7-300 CPUs can be obtained here: https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/ps/13752
- [2] An overview of the operational guidelines for Industrial Security (with the cell protection concept):

https://www.siemens.com/cert/operational-guidelines-industrial-security

- [3] Information about Industrial Security by Siemens: https://www.siemens.com/industrialsecurity
- [4] For further inquiries on vulnerabilities in Siemens products and solutions, please contact the Siemens ProductCERT:

https://www.siemens.com/cert/advisories

HISTORY DATA

V1.0 (2016-06-08): Publication Date

DISCLAIMER

See: https://www.siemens.com/terms_of_use


SSA-818183 © Siemens AG 2016 Page 1 of 2 SSA-818183 © Siemens AG 2016 Page 2 of 2

Responsibilities – and how testing can help










Cyber security testing & the Penetration Testing Execution Standard



Example vulnerabilities in control systems at sea

Design, documentation, & implementation

- Re-use of IP address ranges across vessels: shortcut for easier overview, maintenance, and logging;
- Deployment of networking gear does not match topology drawings;
- Internal clocks in ballast water treatment control system showing 1994 as date, making forensics difficult;
- Large amount of default credentials, e.g. publicly known factory default passwords;

Patching & hardening

- Windows OS updated only during major upgrades, i.e. up to 3 years outdated; OS installations configured with standard settings;

Network segregation


- OT device(s) connected to insecure on-board WiFi;
- No Anti-virus on "island-mode" workstations; Undetected infection of Loading computer; Skype installed on tank sounding computer;

Removable storage

- No defined policies to follow by associated vendors/service personnel: service provider technician uses own USB stick to print reports;
- Single USB stick policy. But, personal HDD used by crew member to backup "in case something gets lost"; SD card used between camera and workstations;


Network and software robustness

- Alarm monitoring system susceptible to loss of view (DoS); Alarm overflow: after a certain number, no further alarms can be received;
- Loss of positioning when overloading DP network. Loss of all posrefs, gyros and VRSs; Standby DP controller is shutdown when 1% traffic is introduced; Network storm on one DP operator station results in both redundant operation stations being "in command" at the same time;
- Emergency disconnect sequence of a BOP does not start when commanded from HMI when PLC subject to networks stress;




Cyber readiness of vessels Risk assessment & penetration testing

Activities conducted to uncover vulnerabilities and find possible chains leading to compromise:



The three pillars of cyber security



Thank you for your attention!

Mate J. Csorba PhD, CEH

Mate.Csorba@dnvgl.com

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