

Evaluating Russia's Rotorcraft Use During Ukrainian-Russian Conflict (Feb. 2022 – Feb. 2024)

-SECOND PART-



...if you attended the first part of the briefing this morning...

PLEASE RISE UP THE HAND.

**THANKS** 



**Joint Air Power** 

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# **Summary – Second year of conflict** Fast recap about RUS RW assets Joint Air Power Competence Centre Reports from last year of war (Feb.2023-Feb. 2024) Analysis of main tech updates Doctrinal and C2 changes Logistical adaptations Conclusions

# ATTACK/C2 HELICOPTER KA-52 HOKUM-B

#### Small, Fast, Agile

- + Survivability
- + Lethality

#### Main missions

- Close Air Support (CAS)
- Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI)
- Battlefield reconnaissance (SCOUT)
- **Deep Operations**
- Air to Air Combat (AAC)
- Command and Control (C2)
- Target designation and sharing (C2)



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#### ATTACK HELICOPTER Mil-Mi-28 HAVOC

#### A pure attack helicopter:

- ✓ All weather
- ✓ Day- night
- ✓ Two tandem seat
- ✓ No secondary transport capability
- ✓ Able to conduct a loop with standard load

#### Main performable missions:

- ✓ Close Air Support (CAS)
- ✓ Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI)
- ✓ Battlefield reconnaissance (SCOUT)
- ✓ Deep Operations



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# ATTACK HELICOPTER Mil Mi-24/35 HIND/D

- Helicopter gunship
- Transport capacity up to 8x pax
- Attack Helicopter
- Payload 2400 kg
- Updated with new generation of navigation and target acquisition systems
- Protected by armour plating elements
- Low cost / High effectiveness

State of the art NAV and TGT SYS

2 x Barrel 23 mm Cannon Missile, Rockets and cannon PODs
/ fuel tanks









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# **Summary – Second year of conflict** Reports from last year of war (Feb.2023-Feb. 2024) Joint Air Power Competence Centre Analysis of main tech updates Doctrinal and C2 changes Logistical adaptations **Conclusions**

#### Since Last Year's Report...

#### ...RUSSIAN ATTACK HELICOPTERS HAVE BECOME A KEY ELEMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS:

...the 'single most influential asset in the conflict'....



UPDATE ON UKRAINE 27 July 2023

#### INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- As Ukrainian forces continue major offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia
  Oblast, one of the single most influential Russian weapon systems in the
  sector is the Ka-52 HOKUM attack helicopter. Russia has highly likely lost
  around forty Ka-52s since the invasion, but the type has also imposed a
  heavy cost on Ukraine.
- In recent months, Russia has highly likely augmented the force in the south with at least a small number of brand new, Ka-52M variants: a heavily modified aircraft, informed by lessons from Russia's experience in Syria. Evidence supporting the M variant's use in Ukraine includes photos posted on social media of aircrew posing next to the new aircraft and thanking well-wishers for sending them morale items.
- Another key improvement to the Ka-52 fleet is the integration of a new anti-tank missile, the LMUR, which has a range of approximately 15km.
   Ka-52 crews have been quick to exploit opportunities to launch these weapons beyond the range of Ukrainian air defences.

...KA 52 'Putin's vulture'...





# Year Two -Highlights-

# ...RUSSIAN ATTACK HELICOPTERS HAVE BECOME A KEY ELEMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS:

... the lethality of attack helicopters in the last year has significantly increased ...





# FINANCIAL TIMES

Naturally, we have to treat official economic data in President Vladimir Putin's Russia with considerable caution. But the picture painted by these three ndicators is probably not far from the truth. Eighteen months after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia displays many classic symptoms of a wartime economy, such as inflation, labour shortages, rising government expenditure and deficit financing.



## **Comparing dates**



#### **DOWNED HELICOPTERS**

- February 2022 > 2023 =  $\sim 42$
- February 2023 > 2024 = ~ 19

**ABOUT 52% LESS THE FIRST YEAR** 






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# HELY DESTROYED / DAMAGED ON GROUND

- February 2022 > 2023 =  $^{\sim}17$
- February 2023 > 2024 = ~ 28

**ABOUT 40 % MORE THE FIRST YEAR** 



# ...from easy target...







...to worst enemy!





Feb-2023 > Feb 2024

#### Second Year



#### **Results**





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#### **Main Developments areas**

improvements in certain technological aspects of helicopters;

 adaptation of doctrine to the new capabilities offered by new technologies;

exploitation and improvement of logistical capabilities.







# The best war teacher...





# ...the battlefield!



**NEW VERSION OF MI -28 > MI-28 NM (HAVOC)** 





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#### **NEW VERSION OF KA-52 > KA-52 M HOKUM-B**





FIRST YEAR OF WAR (Feb.2022-2023)




Poor efficiency of self-protection systems

New and updated self –protection systems

#### **SECOND YEAR OF WAR (Feb.2023-2024)**







Vitebsk-25 Air defence System









THE SAME SYSTEM (SAME COMPONETS) FITS ALL DIFFERENT TYPE OF HELICOPTERS





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THE SAME SYSTEM (SAME COMPONETS) FITS ALL DIFFERENT TYPE OF HELICOPTERS

FIRST YEAR OF WAR (Feb.2022-2023)



Poor efficiency rotors antivibration system

Updated vibration reduction system (KA -52 M)



**SECOND YEAR OF WAR (Feb.2023-2024)** 





Poor efficiency of night vision and acquisition system

New night vision and acquisition system



FIRST YEAR OF WAR (Feb.2022-2023)





**SECOND YEAR OF WAR (Feb.2023-2024)** 





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MUltiRole

Anti Armour

Missile

**LMUR** 



# **Passive protection**

#### **ARMORED PROTECTIONS**



#### **PILOTS EJECTION SYSTEM**



#### **NO TAIL ROTOR**



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TWO CONTRAROTATING COAXIAL ROTOTRS







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#### **C2** and Doctrinal ADAPTATION

**USE OF COMBINED CAPABILITIES: EW + ATTACK** 



#### **INCREASE IN NIGHT MISSIONS**



USE OF UAS TO DIRECT AND OBSERVE HELICOPTERS MISSIONS (Feb.2023-2024)









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
#### **LOGISTICAL ADAPTATONS**

FIRST YEAR OF WAR (Feb.2022-2023)



Western made components into Russia weapons and systems

Western made components replaced with other countries made components



SECOND YEAR OF WAR (Feb.2023-2024)





**Embargo effects** 

New supplies routes reduced Embargo effects




#### **LOGISTICAL ADAPTATONS**

FIRST YEAR OF WAR (Feb.2022-2023)


**Outdated maps were provided to troops** 








## **LOGISTICAL ADAPTATONS**














Confirms the validity of the attack helicopter as a fundamental asset in current conflicts



# SPEED UP DOCTRINAL REVISION PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGICAL INCORPORATION











# INCREASE FOCUS ON FORCE PROTECTION:

- AIRPORT FACILITIES
- -TAKE-OFF/LANDING AREAS
- -LOGISTICAL AREAS
- -MAINTENANCE AREAS







# **INCREASE STANDARDIZATION:**

-AMMUNITIONS

-SPARE PARTS

-MECHANICAL FLUIDS





# SET THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND QUANTITY

# **But Ukraine has Improved too...**



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
#### **KAMIKAZE DRONE**



#### **LOITERING AMMUNITION**



## MI-28 downed by a drone.





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
# This Briefing is IN- LINE with ....




## JAPCC REQUEST FOR SUPPORT

# Fill the Request for Support Format...

... and send it!!!



www.japcc.org



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Request for Support





Thanks for the attention.

Questions?