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The Minister of National Defence of Canada The Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Denmark The Minister of Defence of the French Republic The Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Ministry of Defence of the Italian Republic The Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of The Netherlands The Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway

The Minister of National Defence of the Portuguese Republic

The Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Spain The Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

The Secretary of Defense of the United States of America NATO Science and Technology Organisation Centre for Maritime Research and

NATO Maritime Commander CONCERNING

DEPLOYABLE ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE BARRIER Smart Defence Initiative 1.1271

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MARCOM NATO CMRE Observe

NATO ASW Barrier Project

- ASW A NATO priority area
- Threat vehicles Increasingly difficult targets
- Cross domain by nature
- Conventional capability complex & expensive MUS provides - Mass / Persistence / Innovation
- Barrier of multiple heterogeneous systems
- Need Allied collaboration to be effective Not always intuitive with ASW



Enhanced ASW capability via **Allied MUS Teaming**

Common Intent

- Recognize that NATO has identified a requirement for a deployable Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) barrier utilising unmanned system components,
- Consider that multinational cooperation in this capability area could enable them to reach national capability targets more efficiently and close specific NATO capability shortfalls and national commitments,
- Acknowledge that there is a diverse range of technical solutions,
- Acknowledge that several Signatories, as well as the NATO Strategic Commands and the CMRE, have existing programs or aspirations to develop technologies and components that could comprise solutions to an effective deployable barrier,

- Acknowledge that it would be of mutual benefit to all interested signatories to establish a formal cooperation to standardize requirements, demonstrate and share capabilities, set priorities and apportion future work on a basis of mutual benefit and burden sharing,





Project Director – Cdre (Rtd) David Burton





Key UW Operational Problems

- Retention of ASW Advantage in SACEUR's AOR.
- Detection / Classification and Tracking of new generation peer competitor submarines and UUVs.
- Deter peer competitor submarines and UUVs from specific areas and from conducting specific activities.
 - Maintain NATO Freedom of Action.
- Wide Area Ocean Surveillance re-instating maritime mass.
- Difficulty of Integrating MUS into Maritime Operations.



NATO ASW BARRIER SDI PROGRAMME



Work Package A ITA MUS Capabilities Systems Analysis & Performance Assessment

Work Package B Command & Control (C2) Architecture and Interoperability

Work Package C Data Management, AI, Security Work Package D Maturity Framework, Analysis Tools and M&S Work Package E

Concepts, Doctrine and Key User Requirements

Mission: To develop a technical demonstrator comprising both legacy and interoperable MUS solutions to securely provide a force multiplying ASW capability. 'Hold at Risk'



ASW SDI Nations

Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, US, + Finland

ASW SDI NATO Bodies as signatory stakeholders NATO STO CMRE / COM MARCOM

Approach

Collaboration - National Programmes Exploiting Operational Experimentation Funded Industry Challenges

Benefits

Accelerating capability delivery Realising economies of scale Sharing cost and risk Developing common standards Ensuring interoperability Reducing stove-pipe solutions Developing common tools

Deployable ASW Barrier – Unified Concept

- Defines a set of high-level Concepts, which form the basis for designing and implementing a Deployable ASW Barrier (DASWB)
- The Concepts form the guidance for the design, implementation and conduct of DASWBs, harnessing the evolving operational advantage of maritime unmanned systems (MUS).
- It is an essential foundation document for all NATO ASW stakeholders and future doctrinal development.
- Concepts correlated with a set of key user Requirements.





ASW Barrier – Hold at Risk Concept

'ASW Barrier Hold at Risk Concept' Choke Point (Straight line) Static barrier/net

LAUNCH – RECOVERY Launch / Recovery from shore, time factor to attain initial positions

BARRIER DURATION Max Duration ... months (possible substitution of various elements for check)

Communication & Data exchange

Underwater elements communicate with bottom nodes and gateway boys. UAV, USV, Shore radar, Gateway Buoy using RF or Satcom with MOC and Ship. Gliders use RF or Satcom with MOC and Ship. Scenario: Enemy Subs or UUVs are using a choke point before reaching their area of deployment. Maritime Commander has ordered the deployment of Unmanned ASW Barrier along with capable ASW unit to detect and track enemy assets.



ACTION: Upon ASW Commander's order Barrier's network is active and gradually all elements take initial positions. UAVs covering forward XXX nm from line of the barrier towards enemy threat axis, USVs covering from XXXX nm from barrier. UUVs are patrolling in different depths on either side of barrier from XXX nm. Radar station is feeding neutral, suspect surface targets de-conflicting the underwater recognized picture. ASW Commander is changing if needed tasking and mission parameters from threat assessment. Weapon use only from Legacy units or USV upon ASW Commander order (ROE approved).

Possible Elements

- Operation Center (MOC Trola)
- ASW Frigate (Legacy Helo)
- LUUV with Towed Array

 Bottom nodes (passive, active, underwater comms)

- Surface gateway buoys
- UAS rotary (EO/R/ESM/Radar)
- USV Acoustic gateway and ISR
- USV (Towed array)
- Sonobuoys
- Small UUVs (pessive -active)
- Gliders (REA & ASW)
- Shore Radar Station (TBC)

Co-Operation

ASW Barrier has one MOC (shore) stby onboard ASW units.

ASW units have organic Helo in ASW mode notionaly armed. ASW units provide local AAW-ASUW protection to ASW barrier elements.

ASW Characteristics

Overt Operation, Peace Time or Crisis ROE, ASW is Commander feeding threat assessment, Mission: Detect, Track & ready to Shoot. No other enemy unit in AOO.



C2 Architecture



AUWB - MN

The Allied Underwater Battlespace Mission Network (AUWB-MN) is an essential feature of any future NATO underwater MUS capability.

It will exploit both acoustic communication and more novel techniques to provide:

- Reliable underwater communications.
- Interfaces to above water terrestrial and satellite comms.
- Deliver effective C2.
- Act as the conduit for data harvesting, data fusion, and exploitation.



AUWB-MN – Industry Challenge

- 1x unit of National investment results in multiple units of overall investment.
- Supports NATO C3 Board's Digital Exploitation Framework Strategy & NATO Digital Ocean project.
- Interoperability is a collective free good.
- Secure by design.
- National industry and R&D will be furnished with a set of standards which guarantee interoperability – increased sales.





AUWB-MN Outputs - 2 Phases



A REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE A REFERENCE ENVIRONMENT

Phase 1 - 1M Euro Challenge



- Reference Architecture (RA)
- Test and Reference Environment (TRE)
 - simulated & live demonstration.
 - physical instantiation of systems to interface with National MUS capabilities.
- Priority use cases
 - ASW
 - MCM
 - REA
 - Seabed Warfare

AUWB-MN Challenge - Phase 1 Timeline

- White Papers Invited SOR & Guidance Documents Issued Nov 23.
- White Papers Evaluated and feedback sent Apr 24.
 - Industry conference held,
- Formal ITT Full Submission issued end May 24.
- Industry develop full submissions submit by Aug 24.
- CEVB evaluate proposals until Oct 24.
- Early Nov 24 Winner Announced. Contract Awarded.
- November 24 work commences. Phase 1 Contract completion Feb 25.
- Phase 2 Dedicated TRE demonstration in REPMUS early 2026.



Common Maturity Framework

How to measure progress



Concept What can it do?

Minimum Viable Product Will it do the job?

Make it useful?

Minimum Viable Capability War Winning Capability Make it threatening?

CMF is a discussion handrail to establish a collective understanding of maturity and development priority for human and technology factors that must be, at some point, addressed to deliver an end vision involving **Autonomous Systems**

Assessment Factors



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Advantage	Consent & Confidence	Platforms & Payloads	Data & Algorithms	Integration & Interoperability	Expertise & Enterprise
CONEMP & Mission Adaptability	Legal & Regulatory	Deployability	Data Requirements	Open Architecture & Standards	SQEP
Benefits	Policy & Risk Appetite	Power & Propulsion	Availability & Access	Human-Autonomy Teaming & Control	Organisational Readiness & Governance
User Needs	Security	Persistence	Autonomous Functions (AI & Algorithms)	Communication & Networks	Support & Infrastructure
Risk	Trust	Reach	Data Processing	Command & Tasking	Cultural Acceptance
Cost	Resilience	Accuracy	Data Quality	Allied Interoperability	Ethics
Scalability	Survivability	Reliability	IX & Decision Support	IP & Sovereignty	Acquisition & TLCM



Priority View Example

Advantage	Consent & Confidence	Platforms & Payloads	Data & Algorithms	Integration & Interoperability	Expertise & Enterprise
Concept Definition & Adaptability	Legal & Regulatory	Deployability	Data Requirements	Open Architecture & Standards	People & Training
4 2	3 1	4 4	4 1	4 2	2 1
Benefits	Policy & Risk Appetite	Power & Availability & Endurance Access		Human- Autonomy Teaming & Control	Organisational Readiness & Governance
3 2	4 1	2 3	3 3	3 2	1 4
User Needs	Security	Persistence Autonomous Functions		Communication & Networks	Support & Infrastructure
2 1	1 1	3 4	5 4	5 1	2 1
Risk	Trust	Reach	Data Processing	Physical Integration	Cultural Acceptance
2 2	4 2	4 2	3 1	4 1	3 3
Cost	Resilience	Accuracy	Data Quality	Command & Tasking	Ethics
4 3	3 2	3 1	4 2	2 2	4 4
Scalability	Survivability	Reliability	Reliability IX & Decision Support		Acquisition & TLCM
1 3	1 3	2 1	1 1	1 2	1 4

0



1-5

Factor NameMaturityPriorityScoreScore

1-5



REPMUS is a Portuguese-led experimentation exercise which focuses on Maritime Unmanned System (MUS) experimentation, capability development and interoperability.

It is conducted annually and is designed to allow large-scale operational experimentation (OPEX), where operational communities engage with industry and academia to promote the integration of MUS in maritime operations.

The experimentation activities comprise the test of systems during sea trials as well as the test and validation of experimental tactics (including EXTACs) on MUS to address key operational problems (KOP).

The 2024 edition will be conducted in the North Atlantic Portuguese Exercise Areas, from 09-27 September 2024.



Organisation

PRT-N

Oporto University JCGMUS (was MUSI) NATO CMRE

Multinational Led Working Groups

REPMUS 23 UW Nations and Industries

- SAAB (UK)
- SAAB (SWE)
- SOTIRIA
- BLUE OASIS
- ELTA
- ATLAS ELEKTRONIK
- SHIEBEL
- TEKEVER
- TELEDYNE
- RS AQUA

- IQUA ROBOTICS
- INESCTEC
- NOKIA _ ASN
- QINETIQ
- GRAALTECH
- LEONARDO
- FINCANTIERI
- SONARDYNE
- SEEBYTE

• DSTL

REPMUS 23 UW (ASW & CUI) Assets and Capabilities

NRP DOM

CARLOS







ITS CARABINIERE

XV PATRICK BLACKETT

NRP SINGE

NRP ANDROMEDA



Blue Whale with LFAS Sonar System













Recall ASW Target



Target





DECIBEL







EVA ROV



SAND



Sonobuoys)







Bottom Node

- **MIRAYA Exercise reconstruction and** ٠ analysis
- **OPTO_DAS Cable monitoring and detection** ٠ system
- Hydrophones & magnetometer systems ٠
- **Data Fusion Cell** •
- Sonobuoy relay, recording and processing ٠ systems
- Data analysis and C2 tools for ASW



CAMCOPTER S-100 (with

Trials and Vignettes









UAVs	USVs	UUVs	UGVs	Warships	Research Ships
37	20	36	2	15	10



advance of sensor

arrays

advance of sensor arrays

advance of sensor arrays

advance of sensor

arrays

by various targets in

advance of sensor

arrays

Μ

REPMUS 24 ASW Timeline



Mon 23	Tue 24	Wed 25	Thu 26	Fri 27
Integrated Tactical Serial	AM Amphibious Serial			
Deep Water CUI Survey / Change Detect / Intervene	ASW Barrier – Detect / Track to screen CUI			
ASW Barrier – Detect / Track to screen CUI Build realistic Barrier test with complex presentation of multiple targets AWW Threat - Provision of FP to ASW Activity	Build realistic Barrier test with complex presentation of multiple targets Support Amphibious Ops with ASW Barrier protect	Spare	DV Day	
PP to ASW Activity	Evening / Night Amphibious Serial ASW Barrier – Detect / Track to screen CUI Build realistic Barrier test with complex presentation of multiple targets Support Amphibious Ops with ASW Barrier protect	DV Day Rehearsal		

REPMUS 24 ASW

- 6 x ASW Target Systems
- 9 x Bottom Nodes
- 1 x Hydrophone and magnetometer array
- 3 x Communications gateway Buoys
- 3 x Underwater Gliders with Spatial Arrays
- 1 x Surface towed acoustic array systems
- 1 x Surface towed optical thin line array system
- 2 x ASW ISR capable UAS with sonobuoy dropping capability
- 1 x Airborne Sonobuoy relay
- 1 x Sonobuoy processing system
- 1 x LAUV with hybrid sensors
- 3 x ASW sound Source
- 1 x Acoustic vector sensor
- 3 x Magnetic Anomaly Detector
- 1 x USV with Dipping Sonar
- ASW Data Processing systems
- Hydrophone buoys
- Opto DAS fibre optic system
- Remote connectivity to live USVs with ASW sensors in Australia





- 1. Multi-static Active ASW
- 2. Bi-Static and Passive ASW
- 3. ASW C2 (Barrier Concept)
- 4. ASW C2 and Data connectivity (STANAG 4817 – COP)

REPMUS 24 UW Placemat – 20 Sep 24 (Fri)

		Reserva	
TASKS: Passive & Active ASW Barrier testing NLD / DEU / DNK / NOR / FIN / PRT / SWE / UK Multistatic (Scenario C)	81-3 550 B1.4 B1	5 C1.1 C1.2 Serra 0 Forte do Cavalo De Salimitation o Sesimbra	R 6s34m12M C G PRO SHOO
UAS & Sonobuoys	Cabo Espichel	Cabo Se Ares	68
Complex unalerted Target presentations by various targets in advance of sensor arrays	BE 3 120 BZ BZ	Halcyon Sonar	3 C2.4 C2.5 2 G2 G
Supported REPMUS Goals & Objectives:	ALL CONTRACTOR		JKT
G: 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4	83.3 83.4 83		G3.4 C3.5 G3.6
O: 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 D: 3.3 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.3			
	B4:3 B4.4	TDY / DEU JASCO Gliders with spatial Arrays	3 C4.4 249 Q4.5 Q486
Considerations: AUV62 Corridor (NMW) (Coordinate)	NHÃO	131	110 3 8
NLD / DEU Recover nodes O/C o/c tracking runs with SEMA.	Mi Kand B	DOS DE ALVA	
All in water activity to be iaw the SOE Organic Rhibs from HELM and KALK for PAX tx from Sesimbra and	l recovery of Nodes	Assets:	
Sound source to be in NMT 100m water Halcyon with OPTI 11 Array fitted to do a circuit of Nodes area fm	1 Sesimbra	1 x DEU GW Buoy (DEU) 4 x Bottom Nodes (DEU/NL) 750m spac	2 x GW Buoy ing Norway (3) and Sweden (3) Bottom nodes
Patrick Blackett with JASCO array tbc. Patria Tgt to run E/W. Patria controlled via DEU Gateway		2 x SEACAT (Deu) 2 x SEMA (DEU/NL) (2) N261	OPTO Das 1 Passive Vector (DEU)
EDA SALSA CAPTEC Demo Harbour container (Strangle All emitter Gavia test and passive target for Nodes. Gavia provide LF frequency for OPTODas.	s)	OPTO Array (SWE) Patria (FIN)	HELMSAND and KALKGRUND (DEU)
HLEM/KALKJ TX IFS signals overnight. 10NM W. Portuguese Authority - Risk Managed		1 x Rhib (Dipping Sonar) (NL)	GEO Sea (NL)
Overnight "Buoy Sitting" vessel – if required NLD Recopver nodes Friday pm		Recall / Patria (2) Carrequeira	OP II 11 array on Haicyon USV.
Gavia hot available		da Baiyo	





QUESTIONS