



Ready To Respond – Adaptable & Scalable – Sovereign, Multinational and Interagency

Joint Expeditionary Force



**Standing Joint Force
Headquarters Group**

**Capt Dan Thomas RN
ACOS Ops**



Strategic Command



Strategic Command

STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS GROUP

Ready To Respond – Adaptable & Scalable – Sovereign, Multinational and Interagency

WHO WE ARE

JFHQ
1* Extremely High
Readiness HQ



SJFHQ
2* Very High
Readiness (VHR) HQ



SJFLogC
1* VHR Theatre
Logistics HQ



JOINT &
INTEGRATED



MULTINATIONAL



WHAT WE ARE



Foreign, Commonwealth
& Development Office

HOW WE DO IT



INNOVATION



CONTINGENCY
PLANNING



JFHQ RECCE & LIAISON
TEAMS (OLRTs)



DISASTER
RESPONSE



SJFHQ EARLY ENTRY
HQs & CRISIS MANAGEMENT



COMPLEX
OPERATIONS

PARTNERSHIPS

COMBINED JOINT
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE



JOINT EXPEDITIONARY
FORCE




NATO & US COMMANDS



OPERATIONS

68

operations in
21 years



16

operations
in 2020-23



@SJFHQ_UK



@standingjointforcehq



@SJFHQGroup



JOINT
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FORCE

What is the JEF?

Joint Expeditionary Force

The JEF is a coalition of ten like-minded Northern European NATO nations, who share a commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

WHO WE ARE


A NATO initiative
coherent with, and
complementary to,
NATO activity



Multinational
by design



JEF 2* operational HQ
(Coordinates and
coheres JEF activities)



WHAT WE ARE

A flexible, adaptable,
non-consensus organisation; UK
is the Framework Nation



Focussed on hybrid threats and
NATO Article 3



Article 3
Deterrence &
Resilience

HOW WE DO IT



REGIONALLY
FOCUSED



EMBEDDED JEF
LIASON OFFICERS



JEF LIASON VISITS AND KEY
LEADER ENGAGEMENT



JEF RESPONSE
OPTIONS (JROs)



JEF 2* OPERATIONAL HQ
(Coordinates and coheres JEF activities)



MULTI-DOMAIN SCALABLE
RESPONSE PACKAGES (SRP)

PARTNERSHIPS



NETWORKED ACROSS JEF
MODs, CJOs & OGDs



BILATS, TRILATS,
MULTILATS



NATO & US
COMBATANT COMMANDS

JEF ACTIVITIES

10

GROWN TO 10
NATIONS OVER
10 YEARS
(All are now
NATO members)



6

JEF ACTIVITIES
IN 2023-25



The JEF: An Operational Journey



FORCE DEVELOPMENT (2014-2020)

NATO Framework Nation Concept: Wales Summit
Non-Consensus or 'Opt-In' – **Flexible and Agile**
Not a force in being
Directed to focus **regionally and below the threshold of conflict**

INITIAL RESPONSE TO INVASION (24 Feb 22 – Nov 22)

Political progress
JEF Integration Options (JIO)
HQ Activated: **Operational Co-ordination Cell**
Directed to explore **relationship with NATO & continue planning**

INITIAL 'OPERATIONALISATION' (2021)


JOINT PROTECTOR: 1st op. level exercise in the sub-threshold
Lessons identified: JEF HQ as a **'Platform for integration'**

CURRENT DEVELOPMENT THEMES (Feb 23+)

Developing the role of the JEF **below the threshold of conflict**.
Plotting a path to **closer integration with NATO**.
Developing the Combined Joint **Interagency Task Force** concept.
Expanding the **JEF Operating Framework**



JEF Operating Framework: JRO Overview




JEF – Joint Expeditionary Force
RP – Regional Plans
SSD – SACEUR’s Strategic Directive
NORDEFECO – Nordic Defence Cooperation

PN – JEF Participant Nations
JRO – JEF Response Options
CCD – Central Coordination Directive
SENOFI – Sweden Norway Finland Def. Coop.

NDP – National Defence Plans
SOF – Special Operations Forces
FDO – Flexible Deterrence Options
TREX – Training and Exercise

SASP – SACEUR’s AOR-wide Strategic Plan
DDA – Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area
FRO – Flexible Response Options
OAI – Operations, Activities, Investments

JEF Operating Framework




JEF: Ongoing Development....

Political Development




NATO Complementarity

JEF Operating Framework




Strategic Communication



Force Development



Broadening JEF Engagement



Developing Hybrid Thinking





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As at 031200ZFEB25

NORDIC WARDEN CHODS Summary

Joint Expeditionary Force


Background

Over the past 14 months, there have been four separate incidents of foreign-flagged vessels damaging Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI) by dragging their anchors:

- 7 Oct 23 - NEWNEW POLAR BEAR against the 'Baltic Connector' gas line.
- 18 Nov 24 - YI PENG 3 against the 'C-Lion 1' data cable.
- 25 Dec 24 - EAGLE S against the 'EstLink 2' power cable.
- 26 Jan 25 - VEZHEN (TBC) against a SWE-LVA data cable.

Allied Response

- **1 Jan 25** - NORDIC WARDEN established.
- **2 Jan 25** - SJFC chaired a VTC with all JEF Participant Nations' OHQs – the activation of 'NORDIC WARDEN' was fully endorsed.
- **10 Jan 25** - NATO MARCOM CUI Enhanced Vigilance Activity (eVA) 'BALTIC SENTRY' commenced - JFC Brunsum Command with a CTF-Baltic lead.



NORDIC WARDEN 25 – Summary

JEF independent activity delivered as NORDIC WARDEN, before NATO eVA (BALTIC SENTRY).

- NORDIC WARDEN established (1 Jan 25) in coordination with NATO MARCOM.
- 24/7 PALANTIR based VOI tracking and reporting with N3 assessment.
- As of 3 Feb 25, 50 Intel Tippers issued to OHQs and MARCOM (for CTF BALTIC).
- Monitoring of c.1300 VOI across JEF region in 22 Named Areas of Interest.
- Co-ordination with JEF PN and UK's Joint Maritime Security Centre (JMSC).

NORDIC WARDEN 25 - Developments

- Constant refinement with JEF partners and JMSC with focus on Baltic area of interest.
- Investment in machine learning / AI and leveraging greater MDI coherence.
- Complementarity with NATO – what comes next post BALTIC SENTRY / NORDIC WARDEN?

25 Dec 24	26 Dec 24	1 Jan 25	10 Jan 25	26 Jan 25	31 Jan 25
<div>EstLink 2 power cable is severed</div> <div>1</div>	FIN detains 'EAGLE S' who is suspected of dragging her anchor	NORDIC WARDEN commences	BALTIC SENTRY commences	SWE-LVA datalink cable is damaged. SWE detains 'VEZHEN'.	NOR detains 'SILVER DANIA' over 26 Jan incident.



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What is the “Shadow Fleet”

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The term “Shadow Fleet” refers to the **~600 vessels** used by Russia to avoid sanctions.

The Shadow Fleet plays a critical role in undermining international sanctions, particularly the **Oil Price Cap** implemented by the G7, the European Union, and Australia.

The sanctions are **to limit Moscow's revenue** streams that fund its military operations.

Since Jun 4, HMG began to specify ships under The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Specified vessels are prohibited from entering a port in the UK,, can be detained, and will be refused permission to register on the UK Ship Register.

The “Shadow Fleet”

- AIS “blackouts” and spoofing common.
- Multiple levels of obscure ownership and management and/or shell companies.
- Ship to Ship Transfer and mixing of oil to disguise its origin.
- Shadow Fleet ships are primarily Panama flagged and Greek owned.
- Over 15 years old, beyond insurance age.
- Over 20 years old, cheap, scrapable.

Headlines


- **4.1 million barrels** a day in Jun 24
- **66%** of Russian seaborne crude oil and biproducts.
- In 9 months of 2024, the Shadow Fleet generated **\$8 Billion** in extra earnings.
- Top three countries importing Russian crude oil; India, China and **Turkey**.
- Concern over conducting **surveillance** around **critical infrastructure**




Fig 1.

With 20 years of delivering outcomes for Defence and National Security orgs


Space Situational Awareness & C2




AI-Augmented
ISR




Operational
Readiness




AI Enabled Maneuver
Planning




Predictive Maintenance &
Logistics



Mission Partner
Collaboration



Force
Management




Multi-Domain
Intelligence



Joint Maritime
Security Centre

Location of 4 x suspected vessels on 27 Jan 25



SILVER DANIA – a Norway flagged cargo ship that departed St Petersburg (Russia) and as of 31 Jan 25 is detained in Tromso by NOR authorities.

MICHALIS SAN - a Malta flagged Bulk Carrier that departed Bejaia (Algeria) continues to await orders to the North of Gotland.


VEZHEN - a Malta flagged Bulk Carrier that departed Ust-Luga (Russia) at 24 0925Z Jan 25. It was IVO the Latvian State Radio and Television Centre fibre optic cable at ~25 2200Z Jan 25. As of 31 Jan 25, is now being detained by SWE authorities. As of 3 Feb 25, VEZHEN released.

PSKOV - a Barbados flagged LNG Tanker has continued its transit to Vysotsk (Russia).

SWE/LVA CUI Damage 26 Jan 25

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Analysis of VEZHEN and MICHALIS SAN at 26 0001Z Jan 25



A [statement](#) from the Bulgarian shipping company (Navigation Maritime Bulgare) that owns 'Vezhen' seized by the Swedish authorities claim that the incident was "***not intentional***".

The statement relates to the fact that the anchor of the ship was dropped to the sea floor during "***unfortunate hydrometeorological conditions in the area***".

Commander of the Latvian Armed Forces Kaspars Pudāns has stated [During an interview for local tv programme](#)

"At the moment, there are advantages for anyone who tries to commit criminal offences in the large area of the Baltic Sea, because at the same time there may be even more than 2000 subjects at sea, but it is not possible to ensure monitoring in every nautical mile, and there is a lack of mechanisms to prevent such crimes".




Joint Maritime
Security Centre

1. Palantir - configured display for CUI protection

Palantir system set up:

- UKHO Nautical Charts map layer and a filtered AIS feed
- Main pipelines and cables overlaid
- Named Areas of interest constructed across the JEF region over critical CUI
- Geofences applied to all areas with associated triggers – semi autonomous



CUI Protection Example

Joint Expeditionary Force

2. Vessel triggers Geofence

- Vessel triggers a low-speed threshold for further investigation by operator
- Palantir identifies vessel as BLOSSOM, IMO 9422457, Barbados flagged with next port of call in Ust Luga, Russia
- A cross check reveals that BLOSSOM is a vessel with Russian links on the UK Sanctions List under a previous name (SCF BAIKAL)



BLOSSOM, formally SCF BAIKAL, from open-source imagery




Joint Maritime
Security Centre

CUI Protection Example

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
3. Assessment of Vessel track

- Ability to display and analyse vessel track by AIS history
- Initial assessment to see if there has been unusual manoeuvring behaviour in the last 12hrs. In this case, BLOSSOM has maintained an expected course.
- Longer track analysis to examine routeing and any unusual behaviour whilst in European waters. No other unusual activity is observed, and an email “tipper” is released to JEF partner nations and NATO.



4. Track replay for Incident Analysis

- Palantir is able to display a vessel's location at the time of any AIS “ping” within the last few days.
- Example below shows BLOSSOM's position 12hrs prior to the Geofence trigger
- Potentially a useful tool for incident analysis and deep examination of vessel track



Position 12 hrs prior to Geofence alert

Summary

- JEF - complementary to NATO and here to stay.
- CUI vs CNI - national not military sport.
- What puts the 'C' in CUI?
- How can we harness Machine Learning / AI better?
- If we can't achieve Measurement of Effect, are we succeeding?
- How can we harness industry and wider OGDs to improve CUI protection?



www.jefnations.org
@JEFnations
#JEFtogether

Questions?

